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Abstract: When undertaking cybersecurity risk assessments, it is important to be able to assign
numeric values to metrics to compute the final expected loss that represents the risk that
an organization is exposed to due to cyber threats. Even if risk assessment is motivated by real-world
observations and data, there is always a high chance of assigning inaccurate values due to different
uncertainties involved (e.g., evolving threat landscape, human errors) and the natural difficulty
of quantifying risk. Existing models empower organizations to compute optimal cybersecurity
strategies given their financial constraints, i.e., available cybersecurity budget. Further, a general
game-theoretic model with uncertain payoffs (probability-distribution-valued payoffs) shows that
such uncertainty can be incorporated in the game-theoretic model by allowing payoffs to be random.
This paper extends previous work in the field to tackle uncertainties in risk assessment that affect
cybersecurity investments. The findings from simulated examples indicate that although uncertainties
in cybersecurity risk assessment lead, on average, to different cybersecurity strategies, they do not
play a significant role in the final expected loss of the organization when utilising a game-theoretic
model and methodology to derive these strategies. The model determines robust defending strategies
even when knowledge regarding risk assessment values is not accurate. As a result, it is possible to
show that the cybersecurity investments’ tool is capable of providing effective decision support.
Keywords: risk assessment; cybersecurity investments; game theory
1. Introduction
Many organizations do not have a solid foundation for effective information security risk
management. As a result, the increasingly evolving threat landscape in combination with the
lack of appropriate cybersecurity defences pose several and important risks. On the other hand,
the implementation of optimal cybersecurity strategies (i.e., formal information security processes,
technical mechanisms and organizational measures) is not a straightforward process. In particular,
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are a priority focus sector for governments’ economic policy.
Given that the majority of SMEs are restricted by limited budgets for investing in cybersecurity,
the situation becomes cumbersome, as without cybersecurity mechanisms in place, they may be
significantly impacted by inadvertent attacks on their information systems and networks, leading,
in most cases, to devastating business effects.
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Issues for SMEs are not only restricted to budgetary limitations. Even if sufficient budgets are
available, investing in cybersecurity is still challenging due to the evolving nature of cyber threats
that introduce several uncertainties when undertaking cybersecurity risk assessments. In this case,
an optimal investment decision made at a single point in time may be proven inefficient in due course
due to: (i) exploitation of newly found vulnerabilities that were not patched by the latest investment
and/or (ii) mistaken values assigned to risk assessment parameters, which can lead to erroneous
optimal cybersecurity strategies.
The purpose of this paper is “to investigate how uncertainties in conducting cybersecurity risk
assessment affect cybersecurity investments”. As such, this paper looks to extend previous work in
the field [1,2]. In the foundation work, the values considered by the simulated environment were
considered completely trustworthy. This meant that the decisions made as the result of the implemented
tools would inform decisions made with complete trust. However, the factors surrounding data
collection and aspects of subjectivity mean that that data cannot be considered with complete trust.
To compensate for a potential lack of trust in the data gathered, the work has been extended
to identify the extent to which the accuracy of the data impacts the outputs of such decision tools.
To capture the inaccuracies in the data collection process, we represent the problem as uncertainty
in the data. Comparisons are made between the values assuming certainty and those displaying
uncertainty. The comparisons are designed to identify the degree to which the variation in the data
supplied to a simulation impacts the decisions made by the tools. This is done by replicating a known
approach, in this case [2]. The outcomes of simulated trials look at the manner in which the uncertainty
impacts the optimal solutions. By looking at the amount of uncertainty needed to change the optimal
solutions, it is possible to understand the level to which the use of such tools is applicable to the real
world. This is such that a tool that requires little uncertainty to cause large changes in the optimal
solutions will be less suited to practical deployment for cybersecurity purposes than those that do not.
Security economics: Security economics is a powerful way of looking at overall system security.
This field has been introduced. The driver of the field is the application of economic analysis to
information security issues. Such analysis aims at addressing the underlying causes of cybersecurity
failures within a system or a network, and it complements pure cybersecurity engineering approaches.
By taking into account economic parameters, we can propose cybersecurity strategies that minimize
risk exposure of systems and networks. It has been shown that spending more on cybersecurity does
not necessarily mean that we achieve higher security levels. This is another key challenge that security
economics can tackle. A critical consideration is that cybersecurity decision-makers can benefit from
security economics approaches, thus making informed decisions about security. It is also worth noting
that many cybersecurity mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic protocols) are used to support business
models than manage risk.
Anderson was the first to discuss the economics of security by arguing that most information
security problems can be explained more clearly and convincingly using the language of
microeconomics [3]. Terms that he used include network externalities, asymmetric information, moral
hazard, adverse selection, liability dumping and the tragedy of the commons [3]. The seminal work
of Gordon and Loeb presents an economic model that determines the optimal amount to invest to
protect a given set of information [4]. This is know as the Gordon–Loeb model, and it considers the
vulnerability of the information to a security breach and the potential loss should such a breach occur.
Anderson and Moore investigate the interface between security and sociology and the interactions
of security with psychology, both through the psychology-and-economics tradition and in response to
phishing attacks [5]. A more technical approach is given by Eeten et al. presenting qualitative empirical
research on the incentives of market players when dealing with malware [6]. In the same vein, a recent
work by Laszka et al. proposes a game-theoretic model that captures a multi-stage scenario where
a sophisticated ransomware attacker attacks an organisation. The authors investigate the decision of
companies to invest in backup technologies as part of a contingency plan and the economic incentives
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to pay a ransom if impacted by an attack [7]. More related work about cybersecurity investments is
presented in the following.
Cybersecurity investments: According to a 2017 IBM report [8], despite a decline of 10% in
the overall cost of a data breach over previous years to $3.62 million, companies in this year’s
study have larger breaches. A study conducted by the Ponemon Institute [9] in 2015 on behalf
of the security firm Damballa shows that although businesses spend an average of $1.27 million
annually and 395 people-hours each week responding to false alerts, thanks to faulty intelligence
and alerts, breaches have actually gone up dramatically in the past three years. There are a number
of challenges faced by organizations when it comes to investing in cybersecurity. Most prominent
amongst these concerns is the issue that the generation of accurate valuations for performing risk
assessment is hindered by a lack of clearly-defined reliable and accountable methods. This is in part
due to the complexity of developing holistic methodologies that model organizations’ assets and
perform appropriate risks assessments to generate optimal solutions.
In cybersecurity, the landscape is ever changing, and the emergence of new threats and
technologies will change the applicability of either the data used to perform the initial risk assessment
or the validity of the risk assessment itself. There are also significant psychological obstacles like the
fact that cybersecurity costs, unlike other expenses, do not induce an easily identifiable return on
investment. Instead, it is a pure protection of existing investments, rather than a method to generate
revenue itself.
Additionally, the concept of subjectivity on the evaluation of cyber risk demonstrates a core
challenge in understanding what the true value of risk is. At a fundamental level, this is due to
personal models and perceptions of risk, which will inform and bias evaluations, leading to uncertainty.
Studies have looked at how different experts evaluate and rank issues in cybersecurity scenarios [10].
Psychological factors like personal risk aversion or risk affinity may thus play a crucial role in data
collection and also the decision-making process.
The literature on the economics of security is quite rich when it comes to methodologies for
investing in cybersecurity [11–15]. In our previous works [1,2], we compared different decision
support methodologies for security managers to tackle the challenge of investing in security for SMEs.
To undertake the risk assessment of the proposed model, we used fixed values for the payoffs of the
players (i.e., defender and attacker). These values were set by using a mapping from the SANScritical
security controls [16] combined with the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) top 25 software
vulnerabilities [17]. The upcoming analysis is based on data published in [18]. Although the use of
data from well-known sources made our risk assessment valid and important, this approach ignored
the fact that in real-world scenarios, there is a very high amount of uncertainty when setting the payoff
values. In fact, even the data used in [1] are just as accurate as the activities undertaken by experts
when defining these values. However, such activities are prone to error due to: (i) being subjective
to the human experience each time; (ii) the evolving threat landscape that unavoidably dictates
new risk assessment values; and (iii) new assets being added to an organization’s environment
(i.e., infrastructure), therefore altering the current security posture of the organization.
Decision under uncertainty:As mentioned in the previous section, decision problems often involve
uncertainty about the consequences of the potential actions. Currently, state-of-the-art decision support
methods in general either ignore this uncertainty or reduce existing information (e.g., by aggregating
several values into a single number) to simplify the process. However, such approaches burn much
information. In [19], we introduce a game theoretic model where the consequences of actions and
the payoffs are indeed random, and consequently, they are described as probability distributions.
Even though the full space of probability distributions cannot be ordered, a subset of suitable loss
distributions that satisfy a few mild conditions can be totally ordered in a way that agrees with the
general intuition of risk minimization. We show that existing algorithms from the case of scalar-valued
payoffs can be adapted to the situation of distribution-valued payoffs. In particular, an adaption of
the fictitious play algorithm allows the computation of a Nash equilibrium for a zero-sum game. This
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equilibrium then represents the optimal way to decide among several options such that the chance of
maximal loss is minimized. The model is described in more depth and illustrated with an example
in [20], and the algorithms are implemented in the free software R [21].
An area where such a framework is particularly useful is risk management. Risk is often assessed
by experts and thus depends on many factors, including the risk appetite of the person doing the
assessment. Additionally, the effects of actions are rarely deterministic, but rather depend on external
influences. Therefore, it is recommended by the German Federal Office of Information Security
to do a qualitative risk assessment, which is consistent with our approach. We have applied the
framework to model security risks in critical utilities such as a water distribution system in [22]. In this
situation, consequences are difficult to predict as consumers are not homogeneous and thus do not
act like a single (reasonable) person. Another situation that can be modelled with this generalized
game-theoretic approach is that of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) [23]. Recently, this type of
attack has gained much attention due to major incidents such as Stuxnet [24] or the attack on the
Ukrainian power grid [25]. We applied this generalized game-theoretic model of APT attacks to two
use cases where the expected loss was estimated either by simulation [26] or expert opinions [27],
depending on which source of information was available. Further, the same framework has been used
to find optimal protection against malware attacks [28].
2. Proposed Methodology
Our work is inspired by two previous papers [1] and [19] to investigate how uncertainties
regarding cybersecurity risk assessment values affect the efficiency of cybersecurity investments that
have been built upon game-theoretic and combinatorial optimization techniques (a single-objective
multiple choice knapsack-based strategy). These uncertainties are reflected in the payoffs of the
organization (henceforth referred to as the defender). Although [1] was proven interesting and
validated the U.K.’s government aforesaid advice, it certainly did not account for uncertainties
in the payoffs of the defender. In real-world scenarios, defenders almost always operate with
incomplete information, and often, a rough estimate on the relative magnitude of known cyber
threats is the only information available to the cybersecurity managers. Furthermore, practical security
engineers will argue that it is already difficult to obtain detailed information on risk assessment
parameters. We envisage that by merging these two approaches, we will be able to offer a decision
support tool for cybersecurity investments with increased resiliency against threats facing SMEs.
More importantly, our work addresses a wider class of cyber threats than commodity cyber threats,
which were investigated in [1]. Although this assumption does not negate the possibility of zero-day
vulnerabilities, it removes the expectation that it is in the best interest of either players to invest heavily
in order to discover a new vulnerability or to protect the system against it.
2.1. Ambiguity in Risk Assessments
Often, a threat can be mitigated by more than one action. When experts come up with different
ways of protecting an asset, the selection should be made for the cheapest to implement, yet most
effective action against the threat. The problem is simple, but not easy, as the cost for an action
may be well known, but not so for the effectiveness or the risk of the threat. This is where things
become necessarily subjective to some extent, since the assessment of a threat’s impact can be done in
several ways:
• simulation: if the underlying system dynamics admits a sufficiently accurate description,
simulations can run.
• expert interviews: brainstorming and individual interviews usually provide a valuable source of
information. Methods like Delphi [29] or other panel data gathering techniques can (and should)
be applied, but in most cases, the aforementioned psychological matters will come into play,
such as:
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– What if only a few experts, up to only a single one, are skilled and willing to utter an opinion
about the risk? How would that expert be convinced to take the “personal risk” of saying
something that guides the decision-makers into making the wrong move (for which the
expert would subsequently be held liable perhaps)?
– On which scale would experts rate the risk? The quality of a subjective estimate may strongly
depend on the scale being prescribed. Typically, companies will here define their internal
risk ratings on nominal scales with textually-defined meanings that are individual for each
security goal. That is, losses of a monetary nature are understood differently compared to
losses of reputation, legal implications or others. A “low” risk in financial terms may thus
mean a loss up to some fixed amount, while a “low” risk for reputation may mean, say, a loss
of up to x% of the customers or market share. Such definitions mostly come in tabular form
to help an expert frame his/her opinion in the given terms on the nominal scale, but what if
the uncertainty is such that more than one category may fit (at least in the expert’s eyes)?
The latter two issues make the data gathering for risk management difficult in practice, but can
be addressed by allowing the experts to provide fuzzy assessments instead of hard statements.
The challenge is adapting the decision theory to work with these fuzzy terms, which technically
amounts to playing games over uncertain numbers, e.g., distributions.
Example: Suppose an expert thinks that the loss is somewhere between medium and high,
but she/he cannot (or does not want to) precisely pin down a number. Why not express the uncertainty
as it is, by saying “the losses will be somewhat between 10,000 e and 20,000 e”, admitting that even
the upper and lower bounds are not fully certain. It is straightforward to express this by a Gaussian
distribution centred in the mean of the two bounds and having a standard deviation σ such that 4σ
equals the given range. This corresponds to a 95.45% chance of the interval covering the true loss,
leaving a 5.5% residual risk of the bounds being still incorrect. Game theory can be soundly defined to
use such a Gaussian density as a direct payoff measure.
2.2. Security Games with Uncertainty
The Cybersecurity Control Games (CSCGs) developed so far [1] do not yet capture this problem
sketched in the previous section: a crisp prediction of the efficacy of cybersecurity controls, as well as
the values of the various other risk assessment parameters is often not possible. Rather, some intuitive
information is available that describes some values as more likely than others. In this paper, we enrich
the model recently presented in [1] by considering uncertainty in payoffs of the defender (and of the
attacker since we play a zero-sum game) in CSCG. This is a two-stage cybersecurity investments model
that supports security managers with decisions regarding the optimal allocation of their financial
resources in the presence of uncertainty regarding the different risk assessment values.
For a specific set of targets of the attacker and security controls to be implemented by the defender,
our approach to cybersecurity risk assessment consists of two main steps. First, a zero-sum CSCG
is solved to derive the optimal level at which the control should be implemented to minimize the
expected damage if a target is attacked. This game accounts for uncertainty about the effectiveness
of a control using the probability distribution as payoffs instead of crisp numbers. As pointed out
in Section 1, we show in [19] that imposing some mild restrictions on these distributions admits the
construction of a total ordering on a (useful) subset of probability distributions, which allows one to
transfer solution concepts like the Nash equilibrium to this new setting.
The most critical part in estimating the damage caused by a cybersecurity attack is predicting
the efficacy of a control to protect a target t. Let us assume that we decide to implement the
control at some level l; then, we denote the efficacy of the control to protect target t as E(l, t).
Typically, it is difficult to estimate this value, even if l and t are known. Thus, we replace the exact
value of E(l, t) by a Gaussian distribution centred around the most likely value e(l, t) with a fixed
variance σ2. For simplicity, we assume that the uncertainty is equal for each cybersecurity control
and implementation level. This assumption can be relaxed if we have obtained an accurate value
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about the efficacy of a cybersecurity process (i.e., a control implemented at some level). In order to
avoid negative efficacy, we truncate the Gaussian distributions to get a proper probability distribution
on [0, 1). Allowing the efficacy of an implementation of a control at level l on target t to be random
yields a random cybersecurity loss S(l, t) = I(t) T(t) [1− E(l, t)]. This is the expected damage
(e.g., losing some data asset) that the defender suffers when t is attacked and a control has been
implemented at level l. This definition of loss is in line with the well-known formula, risk = expected
damage I(t) × probability of occurrence T(t) [30]. We assume that this loss will take values in
a compact subset of [1,∞). The losses in our games are thus random variables, so at this point,
we explicitly deviate from the classical route of game theory. In particular, we do not reduce the
random payoffs to expected values or similar real-valued representatives. Instead, we will define
our games to reward us in terms of a complete probability distribution, which is convenient for
several reasons:
• Working with the entire probability distribution preserves all information available for the
modeller when the games are defined. In other words, if empirical data or expertise on losses or
utilities are available, then condensing them into a humble average sacrifices unnecessarily large
amounts of information;
• It equips the modeller with the whole armoury of statistics to define the payoff distribution,
instead of forcing the modeller to restrict himself/herself to a “representative value”. The latter
is often a practical obstacle, since losses are not always easily quantifiable, nor expressible on
numeric scales (for example, if the game is about critical infrastructures and if human lives are at
stake, a quantification in terms of “payoff” simply appears inappropriate).
Note that uncertainty in our case is essentially different from the kind of uncertainty that Bayesian
or signalling games capture. While the latter is about uncertainty in the opponent, the uncertainty in
our case is about the payoff itself. The crucial difference is that Bayesian games nonetheless require
a precise modelling of payoffs for all players of all types. This is only practically feasible for a finite
number of types (though theoretically not limited to this). In contrast, our games embody an infinitude
of different possible outcomes (types of opponents) in a single payoff, thus simplifying the structure
of the game back into a standard matrix game, while offering an increased level of generality over
Bayesian or signalling games.
In CSCG (a matrix game), the defender and attacker have finite pure strategy spaces L, T
(where l ∈ L, t ∈ T ) and a payoff structure of the defender, denoted by A, which in light of the
uncertainties intrinsic to cybersecurity risk assessment, is a matrix of random variables. During the
game-play, each player takes his/her actions at random, which determines a row and column for the
payoff distribution Fi,j. Repeating the game, each round delivers a different random payoff Rij ∼ Fij,
the distribution of which is conditional on the chosen scenario i ∈ L, j ∈ T . Thus, we obtain the
function Fij(r) = Pr(Rij ≤ r|i, j). By playing mixed strategies, the distribution of the overall expected
random payoff R is obtained from the law of total probability by:
(F(Φ,Θ))(r) = Pr(R ≤ r) =∑
i,j
Pr(Rij ≤ r|i, j) · Pr(i, j) = ΦTAΘ, (1)
when Φ,Θ are the mixed strategies supported on L, T and the player’s moves are stochastically
independent (e.g., no signalling).
Unlike classical repeated games, where a mixed strategy is chosen to optimize a long-run average
revenue, Equation (1) optimizes the distribution F(Φ,Θ), which is the same (identical) for every
repetition of the game. The game is in that sense static, but (unlike its conventional counterpart) does
not induce repetitions in practice, since the payoffs are random (in each round), but all having the same
distribution. Thus, the “distribution-valued payoff” is always the same (whether there are repetitions
of the game or not).
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2.3. Cybersecurity Investments and Uncertainty
When having c cybersecurity controls, our plan for cyber investment is to solve c CSCGs by
splitting each of them up into a set of m− 1 control subgames with n targets and up to λ implementation
levels for each control, where λ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (we set λ = 0 to indicate that the control is not
implemented at all). For a CSCG, the control subgame equilibria constitute the CSCG solution [1].
Given the control subgame equilibria, we then use a knapsack algorithm to provide the general
investment solution. The equilibria provide us with information regarding the way in which each
security control is best implemented, so as to maximize the benefit of the control with regard to both
A’s strategy and the indirect costs of the organization. For convenience, we denote the control subgame
solution by the maximum level of implementation available. For instance, for control cj, the solution
of control subgame Gjλ is denoted by Q∗jλ. Let us assume that for control j, the equilibria of all control
subgames are given by the set {Q∗j0, . . . , Q∗jm}. For each control, there exists a unique control subgame
solution Qj0, which dictates that control j should not be used.
We define an optimal solution to the knapsack problem as Ψ = {Q∗jλ}, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , c},
∀ λ ∈ {1, . . . , m}. A solution Ψ takes exactly one solution (i.e., equilibrium or cybersecurity plan)
for each control as a policy for implementation. To represent the cybersecurity investment problem,
we need to expand the definitions for both expected damage S and effectiveness E to incorporate the
control subgame solutions. Hence, we expand S such that S(Qjλ, t), which is the expected damage on
target t given the implementation of Qjλ. Likewise, we expand the definition of the effectiveness of the
implemented solution on a given target as E(Qjλ, t). Additionally, we consider Γ(Qjλ) as the direct
cost of implementing Qjλ. If we represent the solution Ψ by the bit-vector~z, we can then represent the
0-1 multiple choice, multi-objective knapsack problem as presented in (2).
max
~z
∑ni=0
{{
1−∑cj=1 ∑mλ=0 E(Qjλ, ti) zjλ
}
I(ti) T(ti)
}
t
s. t.
c
∑
j=1
m
∑
λ=0
Γ(Qjλ), zjλ ≤ B
m
∑
λ=0
zjλ = 1, zjλ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j = 1, . . . , c. (2)
where B is the available cybersecurity budget, and zjλ = 1 when Q∗jλ ∈ Ψ. In addition,
we consider a tie-break condition in which if multiple solutions are viable, in terms of maximizing the
minimum, according to the above function, we will select the solution with the lowest cost. This ensures
that an organization is not advised to spend more on security than would produce the same net
effect. In Figure 1, we have illustrated the overview of the methodology followed to provide optimal
cybersecurity advice supporting decision-makers in deciding about optimal cybersecurity investments.
Figure 1. Overview of the cybersecurity investment methodology proposed in [1].
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3. Experiments
In order to reason about the impact of uncertainty on cybersecurity investment decisions,
experiments were run to see how the optimal decision would change in the event of uncertainty.
The results presented here represent the outcomes of experiments run using a test case comprised of
a sample of 10 controls and 20 vulnerabilities from [18].
A set of different levels of uncertainty is applied across a range of available budgets, consistent
with the methodology presented in [1]. All the reported results are collected in Figure 2, and the
expected damage is defined as a normalized value between 0 and 100. For each budget and uncertainty
level, 300 simulations were run based on a proposed distribution of attacks for testing the optimal
solutions, with the averages presented in Figure 2. Taking this approach leads to aspects of the
diversity seen in the expected damage for each of the solutions for the constant values. This measure
is predominantly used to identify how different amounts of uncertainty impact the reachability of
optimal solutions and, if so, how that would manifest itself in terms of potential damage. Outside of
the lowest budget levels tested, the range in expected damage is small.
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
15
20
25
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40
45
Tested Uncertainty
Ex
pe
ct
ed
D
am
ag
e
Budget 5 (Concrete)
Budget 5 (Variable)
Budget 10 (Concrete)
Budget 10 (Variable)
Budget 15 (Concrete)
Budget 15 (Variable)
Budget 20 (Concrete)
Budget 20 (Variable)
Budget 25 (Concrete)
Budget 25 (Variable)
Figure 2. Expected damage tracked against uncertainty for each experimental configuration.
The tables of this section present the best strategies seen at each budget level when tested with
different levels of uncertainty. The number represents the optimal level that a control should be
implemented at, where 1 dictates the simplest possible configuration, 5 dictates the best, but most
restrictive possible configuration, and 0 represents no implementation of the control. The uncertainty is
modelled by a Gaussian distribution, centred at the predicted damage or efficiency value. The variance
of that distribution is taken as a percentage fraction of its mean value (e.g., 5%, 10%, . . . , in Tables 1–3).
Budget 5: The expected damage is distributed primarily between 35 and 45. The large range of
damage exists because there are few solutions that provide both good coverage and fall within the
budget. With a lack of viable solutions, the possibility of covering every vulnerability in some manner
diminishes. This lack of coverage means that there is likely to be greater discrepancies in the reported
evaluation for possible solutions. Given that the tested solutions at lower levels of uncertainty are the
same, the discrepancies are related to the inherent variance in the testing method.
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The lack of available budget makes the discovery of optimal solutions more difficult. This is given
that the closer the direct cost of a solution tends towards the budget, the more likely the solution under
uncertainty will exceed the budget. When this occurs, there is a penalty for the solution. This means
that having a heavily constrained budget will minimise the pool of solutions.
We see in Table 1a that all optimal solutions tend towards implementing only two controls.
With uncertainty greater than 0.2, we see the same controls, but a different solution. In this case,
the first control is implemented at a lower level, while the third control is implemented at a higher
level. This represents the notion that Controls 1 and 3 are suited to reducing the most pressing
vulnerabilities, but the degree to which one is considered more valuable is dependent on the level of
certainty in the data.
Budget 10: We see that the average expected damage falls in the range of 26–29, which is half
the range seen for Budget 5. With more controls available, the expected damage should go down;
however, at the same time, we see that the solutions become more consistent. The standard deviation
is less than 2.5, with a difference in means that never exceeds 2. This represents more consistency in
security, given that there is better coverage of vulnerabilities by adding additional controls.
Table 1b shows that the optimal results for Budget 10 build on the basic pattern from those
at Budget 5, suggesting implementations for both Controls 1 and 3 regardless of the level of
uncertainty. This is consistent with the idea that Controls 1 and 3 both impact the most pressing
vulnerabilities. This represents that this pair of controls offers the most cost-effective strategy of
covering network vulnerabilities.
Table 1. Optimal solutions.
(a) Budget = 5
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15% 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Budget = 10
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
5% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
10% 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
15% 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
20% 4 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
25% 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
With low uncertainty, Control 9 is considered optimal, but at higher levels of uncertainty,
Controls 7 and 10 are considered optimal. This means that the optimisation algorithm can identify
that there is a set of controls that are consistently effective at providing the desired security, while
the additional controls benefit those vulnerabilities where the expected damage is similar. Essentially,
there are a number of viable solutions for protecting the system with a budget of 10, all of which can
offer similar overall protection, but the most optimal solution is dependant on the variance.
Budget 15: For a budget of 15, we see that the mean expected damage is between 19 and 22.
At this budget and higher, we see that the difference in means between the certain and uncertain
solutions never exceeds 1.
With the increased budget over the previous results, the optimal solution in Table 2a now always
considers a combination of the first three controls. The rest of the budget is used to sporadically patch
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the worst remaining vulnerabilities as dictated by uncertainty. This means that at lower levels of
uncertainty, Control 4 is preferred, while at higher levels of uncertainty, we see that Control 10 becomes
the favoured addition to the base set of controls, with Control 9 preferred at 10% uncertainty.
Interestingly, between an uncertainty of 20% and 25%, Control 3 is used at a higher level, where the
rest of the solutions remains the same. This indicates that in the latter case, the uncertainty in the
values means that there is scope for using a control that might otherwise be out of budget. Given that
uncertainty around the cost of implementation is considered, the variance in the valuation made the
solution viable.
Budget 20: The range of average expected damage is limited to less than 1, with the biggest
discrepancy between the certain and uncertain solution at the 20% uncertainty level.
The optimal solutions from Table 2b add little to the general pattern of solutions that preceded
it, implementing the first 3 controls at varying levels. This is the only time that we see the optimal
solution suggest the highest level of implementation for Control 1. Here, Control 10 is preferred at
lower levels of uncertainty. At higher levels, this and Control 4 are replaced by a combination of
Controls 7 and 8.
Table 2. Optimal solutions.
(a) Budget = 15
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5% 4 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% 4 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
15% 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
20% 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25% 4 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(b) Budget = 20
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
5% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
10% 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
15% 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
20% 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
25% 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
One commonality between budgets of 15 and 20 is that Control 4 is only considered when there is
more certainty in the data. The combination of Controls 2, 4, 9 and 10 identifies the overlap in coverage
for certain vulnerabilities. This identifies where uncertainty can impact the optimal solution. Since
all four controls cover the same set of vulnerabilities, the uncertainty in the costs and efficiencies will
dominate which of those are most effective in any given scenario.
Budget 25: Considering the highest budget tested, we see that the average expected damage has
a range of 1, between 13.2 and 14.2. This results in a difference in means of at most 0.4 and a minimum
of 0.025. This is combined with standard deviations of no greater than 1.2 to provide consistent results
between certain and uncertain solutions.
From Table 3a, the main difference in solutions is that Control 4 becomes a permanent suggestion
for implementation in addition to the other 3 core controls. Up to 20% uncertainty, we see some
variation of 6 controls, with consistent solutions up to 10% uncertainty and a common solution at
15% and 20% uncertainty. At 25% uncertainty, we see that the optimal solution deviates away from
those solutions below. As with all of the results, despite a different solution, we still see a similar
expected damage with the solution created in a certain space. With uncertainty and a wide range of
available configurations, it is reasonable to consider that there will be a number of solutions that offer
similar results. Given that it still shares common factors, we can consider that most of the mitigation is
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handled by those four controls. The mitigation of the additional controls covers the change in values
caused by uncertainty; this is similar to the case seen at 15% uncertainty.
Table 3. Solutions.
(a) Optimal Solutions for Budget 25
Uncertainty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
5% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
10% 4 4 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
15% 4 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 3 0
20% 4 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 3 0
25% 3 2 3 3 0 0 1 0 4 0
(b) Base Solutions for All Budgets Tested
Budget 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 3 2 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. Discussion
This section highlights a number of common themes across the results, considering the expected
results, as well as themes consistent with the optimal solutions.
Across all of the results in Figure 2, we see only a small difference in mean expected damage
between the optimal results with certain and uncertain parameters. This is represented by a difference
in the mean values of comparable results not exceeding one standard deviation. While some of the
consistency is due to multiple evaluations of solutions, the nature of the designs of the solutions
similarly reduces the impact. The hybrid optimization approach requires multiple different negative
perturbations on values to be offset by positive perturbations on other controls before the impact will
be seen. The value suggested by the expected damage captures these differences in the deviation of
the results from the mean.
The optimal results demonstrate a number of changes to the investment strategy as the uncertainty
increases. This change can be explained as a combination of the factors that are uncertain. In general,
this will be as a result of some controls becoming more effective than others at similar tasks.
Less common results will have optimal solutions that might not be considered valid under a certain
set of parameters, but based on uncertainty in the costs, would appear to be genuine. It is with this last
point that we find one of the sources for deviation in the average expected damage seen in the previous
section. Above, we discuss having potentially invalid solutions seen to be optimal, but we also need to
consider the case where the most optimal solution was eliminated due to potentially having a cost that
would exceed the budget.
Uncertainty in the cost is represented most prominently in the results at low budgets. This is
due to the number of viable solutions that can be tested, since most solutions will exceed the budget.
With this, the search space for solutions features more local optima, with less coherent strategies for
traversal. The consistency in the results can be explained by the coverage of certain controls and their
effectiveness at completing that task. Across all the results displayed in Tables 1 and 2, we see that
Control 1 is always selected, and with some limited exceptions, so is Control 3. This gives us an impact
on multiple vulnerabilities tested, causing a reduction in the expected damage. It is only at higher
budgets that we see that the impact of multiple controls better filling the role of Control 3 causes it to
be replaced in the optimal solutions.
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In addition to the idea that we see consistent results across low levels of uncertainty, we also see
that the results identify that although there are a number of differences in the precise optimal solution,
there is commonality among all of the optimal solutions present. The trial was performed with a small
set of attacks and controls. Increasing the number of controls and vulnerabilities could increase the
potential for less consistent solutions, due to more overlap of controls. Regardless of the composition,
good coverage of attack vectors is achieved as the optimal set of controls will always aim to mitigate
the most expected damage across all targets.
A desired outcome of the experimental work was to see the extent of the commonality of optimal
solutions for each of the levels of uncertainty. As has been explained above, we see that there are
a number of commonalities, especially at the same budget levels. Table 3b shows the minimal set of
controls and levels that are implemented regardless of the uncertainty. In comparison to the optimal
results for each of the budget levels, we see that these share common features on the first three
controls and later Control 4. These controls provide a base coverage of the attack vectors, as described
previously. The worst-performing base is that of Budget 10, which reflects that of Budget 5; this is due
to the deviation between low uncertainty and high uncertainty solutions.
If we consider the justification for the commonality in the representation of different controls,
we identify that Control 1 covers half of the vulnerabilities tested to some degree. At the highest
level, it has an efficiency of 0.95 on 7 of those vulnerabilities and 0.5 on the rest. With a high
efficiency on a wide variety of targets, this identifies why it is a logical component of all optimal
solutions. Furthermore, for its cost value, there are no combinations of controls that can offer the same
coverage. Based on both cost and efficiency, the coverage provided by Control 1 exceeds that of both
Controls 5 and 6, which is why they never appear in the solution space. This means that even though
there may be uncertainty about aspects of the performance across the test, the uncertainty was never
enough to justify a shift in optimal controls. However, the uncertainty did result in a shift between the
level for which the control was selected.
The other common control amongst solutions is Control 3. Control 3 is an inexpensive control that
offers good protection against a number of vulnerabilities that Control 1 does not cover. The only other
control that covers a similar range of targets is Control 8. We see at the Budget 25 level that there are
cases where Control 3 is used at a lower level, but in this case, there is not a reduction in the coverage,
as Control 8 performs that task. The number of successful attacks would not be expected to exceed 5%
in any case, reducing to under 1% in the cases of using Control 8, as well. The issue is whether the
reduction is worthwhile under uncertainty when combining changes in efficiency and cost.
The vulnerabilities that are not covered by Controls 1 and 3 are effectively covered by the
remaining controls. In this space, we see that Controls 9 and 10 are utilised at low budget levels,
where 2 and 4 are preferred consistently at higher levels. This is due to lower efficiencies of Controls 9
and 10 versus 2 and 4. However, to cover the same vulnerabilities as either Controls 9 or 10, the solution
requires both Controls 2 and 4, which is infeasible at lower budgets.
Regarding Controls 9 and 10, they appeared to be used interchangeably in most cases. For these
two controls, the optimality of one over the other comes almost completely from uncertainty, with both
controls having similar base efficiencies. This highlights another fact of optimisation of investments in
cybersecurity, in that there are often multiple ways to cover the same vulnerability. Both aspects of
uncertainty in data collection and the business continuity context might define which control works
most effectively for the company, but overall, it is more important to know that the vulnerability is
covered by some control and that the risk is effectively managed.
From the cybersecurity perspective, we consider that there are sets of advice such as the U.K.’s
Cyber Essentials that promote a number of controls. These pieces of advice suggest a set of controls
that is reasonable to implement regardless of the degree of complexity or available budget. The base
solutions shown here offer the same approach, demonstrating what a solution should contain based
on a constrained budget and uncertainty. These base solutions should be taken as a reference point for
building secure systems, with decisions made regarding company-specific requirements.
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
This work extended previous work published in the field of decision support for cybersecurity.
It has demonstrated an approach to cybersecurity investments under uncertainty, where a previous risk
assessment-based model was extended for this purpose. To explore this, a series of experiments looking
at optimal cybersecurity investments under uncertainty was performed. Uncertainty is naturally
a challenge that all cybersecurity managers face when they have to make decisions. The derivation
of exact values for various risk assessment parameters seems like an impossible task. Our work
here highlights that even with some uncertainty in factors that impact payoffs and viable strategies,
there is consistency in the outcomes, where the majority of damage was being mitigated by only
a few cybersecurity controls. Although we have concluded about a set of numerical results that
clearly demonstrate the benefit of our model and methodology, the expected extension of this work
would be to apply the proposed tools to a full realistic case study, allowing for a comparison to expert
judgements, capturing where and how the uncertainty arises.
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